Hastings Law Journal
Volume 36 | Issue 6

Article 4

1-1985

California's Going and Comming Rule in Workers'
Compensation: A New Model for Consistency
Henry Slowik

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Henry Slowik, California's Going and Comming Rule in Workers' Compensation: A New Model for Consistency, 36 Hastings L.J. 969
(1985).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol36/iss6/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

California's Going and Coming Rule in Workers'
Compensation: A New Model for Consistency
In the over seventy years since California first passed legislation establishing workers' compensation benefits,1 the state's courts have denied
coverage to employees who are injured while commuting to and from
work. This rule is commonly known as the "going and coming" rule (the
"Rule"). Its basis lies in the courts' reasoning that the requisite employ2
ment relationship is suspended while the employee is commuting.
Shortly after adopting the Rule, however, the courts began recognizing
exceptions based upon a "special circumstances" showing that an em3
ployment relationship did in fact exist during a particular commute.
These exceptions are now so numerous that courts and practitioners have
difficulty applying the Rule. This Note proposes a model (the "Model")
that would clearly define the "special circumstances" exceptions to the
Rule by focusing on the employee's intended worksite.
In 1917, the California legislature adopted the Workmen's Compensation Insurance and Safety Act ("Act"). 4 The Act provides that an em1. See infra note 4 & accompanying text.
2. Ocean Accident & Guar. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 173 Cal. 313, 322, 159
P. 1041, 1044 (1916), first expressed the Rule:
Therefore an employee going to and from his place of employment is not rendering
any service, and begins to render such service only when. . . arriving at the place of
his employment, he proceeds to use some instrumentality provided by means of
which he immediately places himself in a position to perform his task.
3. Hinojosa v. WCAB, 8 Cal. 3d 150, 157, 501 P.2d 1176, 1181, 104 Cal. Rptr. 456, 461
(1972), provides the modem statement of the Rule:
In substance the courts have held non-compensable the injury that occurs during a
local commute enroute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours in the absence of
special or extraordinary circumstances. The decisions have thereby excluded the ordinary, local commute that marks the daily transit of the mass of workers to and
from their jobs; the employment, there, plays no special role in the requisites of portage except the normal need of the presence of the person for the performance of the
work.
4. This Note will use the term "Act" to encompass all California Labor Code provisions
relevant to the present workers' compensation system. The first statute was a voluntary provision entitled the Roseberry Act, ch. 399, 1911 Cal. Stat. 796. Unfavorable response to the
Roseberry Act resulted in its modification to provide for compulsory coverage by employers,
under the Boynton Act, ch. 176, 1913 Cal. Stat. 279. The Workmen's Compensation Insurance and Safety Act of 1917, ch. 586, 1917 Cal. Stat. 831 (codified as amended at CAL. LAB.
CODE §§ 3200-6208 (West 1971 & Supp. 1985)), refined those previous enactments.
In 1937, the Act was codified in the California Labor Code in an effort to provide uniform
terminology. The Act abrogates the common law defenses, id. §§2801, 3600, and also protects
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ployer is liable for an employee's injury if that injury arose "out of and in
the course of the employment." 5 An employer's liability is not based
upon tort or contract principles, but rather upon the worker's status as
an employee. 6 The legislature sought to provide the employees with a
speedy and fair remedy, regardless of fault, and to provide employers
with predictable liability. 7 This statutory requirement, "arising out of
and in the course of employment," is the fundamental indicator of
whether a compensable injury exists. Despite a statutory directive to
construe the Act liberally in favor of employees, 8 California courts have
historically interpreted the Act to include the going and coming rule,
which significantly limits coverage for employee travel. 9
Generally, the Rule excludes injuries that occur during an ememployers against most negligence suits, for which compensation is provided. Id. § 3601 (West
1971 & Supp. 1985); see also 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.04 (2d ed. 1984); 1 S. HERLICK, WORKERS' COMPENSATION

LAW § 1.1 (3d ed. 1984). The Act was passed because common law remedies were often slow
and uncertain for both employers and employees. The Act was "necessary to overcome the
harsh case law defenses." 1 S.HERLICK, supra, § 1.1; see also 2 W. HANNA, supra, § 1.02.
5. Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other
liability whatsoever to any person except as otherwise specifically provided in Sections 3602, 3706, and 4558, shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an employer for any injury sustained by his or her employees arising out of and in the
course of the employment in those cases where the following conditions of compensation concur:
(2) Where at the time of the injury, the employee is performing service growing out
of and incidental to [the] . . .employment...
(3) Where the injury is proximately caused by the employment ....
CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600(a) (West 1971 & Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). See generally 2 W.
HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(3)(c).
6. 2 W. HANNA, supra note 4, at § 1.05(3).
7. The California Constitution states that the purpose of a workers' compensation system is to "accomplish substantial justice in all cases expeditiously, inexpensively and without
incumbrance of any character." CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 4; see also supra note 4.
8. "The provisions of... this code shall be liberally construed by the courts with the
purpose of extending their benefits for the protection of persons injured in the course of their
employment." CAL. LAB. CODE § 3202 (West Supp. 1985). The liberal construction requirement often plays a critical role in resolving issues under the Rule. See, e.g., Hinojosa v.
WCAB, 8 Cal. 3d 150, 155-56, 501 P.2d 1176, 1180, 104 Cal. Rptr. 456, 460 (1972); Dimmig
v. WCAB, 6 Cal. 3d 860, 867, 495 P.2d 433, 437, 101 Cal. Rptr. 105, 109 (1972); Garzoli v.
WCAB, 2 Cal. 3d 502, 505, 467 P.2d 833, 834-35, 86 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1970); see also 2 W.
HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(3)(c); 1 S. HERLICK, supra note 4, § 1.3.
9. Courts adopted the Rule to assist in interpreting the statutory requirement of "arising
out of and in the course of employment." See Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at 153-54, 501 P.2d at 1179,
104 Cal. Rptr. at 459; Ocean Accident and Guar. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 173 Cal.
313, 322, 159 P. 1041, 1944 (1916) (the first case to express the Rule). An injury "arises out
of" the employment if it occurs by reason of a condition or incident of the employment. 2 W.
HANNA, supra note 4, § 10.01(2). In contrast, an injury is in the "course of employment" if it
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ployee's ordinary commute, because the statutory requirement of an employment relationship is not satisfied.i 0 If, however, special
circumstances are found, then the statutory requirements of an existing
employment relationship are deemed to be satisfied.
Because the Rule significantly limits coverage in employee travel
cases," 1 courts have established on a case by case basis numerous exceptions to avoid its application and allow coverage for employees' injuries
that occur while commuting.' 2 Examples of these exceptions include:
injuries occuring while the employee makes a left turn across traffic in
order to enter the workplace; 13 injuries occuring while the employee is
subject to employer requirements that make the employee's home a second workplace;' 4 injuries occuring while the employee is being reimbursed by the employer for travel expenses;' 5 and injuries occuring in
situations called "special missions," involving requests by the employer
for performance by the employee of unusual errands or for the use of the
16
employer's vehicle.
The confusion arising from ad hoc determinations of the existence of
an exception has led some commentators to suggest that the Rule is unnecessary; they conclude that the statutory requirement of "arising out of
and in the course of the employment" should be strictly applied in all
cases. 17 While the California Supreme Court has not gone as far in its
occurs while the employee is within the scope of his authority, at a place and time that is
reasonable for the employment purpose. Id. § 9.01(1)(b).
The difficulty courts have in interpreting the statutory requirement is evidenced by its
lengthy treatment by commentators. For interpretation of "arising out of," see generally 2 W.
HANNA, supra note 4, § 10.01-10.08; 1 S. HERLICK, supra note 4, § 10.1-10.33; 1 A. LARSON,
THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, §§ 6.00-13.23 (1952 & Supp. 1984). For interpretation of "course of employment," see 2 W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.01-9.04; 1 S. HERLICK,
supra note 4, § 10.1-10.33; 1 A. LARSON, supra, at §§ 14.00-19.63.
10. Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at 157, 501 P.2d at 1181, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 461. See generally 2
W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(3)(c)6 (relationship of the Rule to the statutory requirement).
11. Early interpretation of the Rule, as in Ocean Accident, 173 Cal. at 322, 159 P. at
1044, essentially restricted coverage to injuries on the employer's premises. See also infra
notes 35-37 & accompanying text.
12. "The numerous exceptions are no doubt due to the fact this judge-made rule is somewhat arbitrary and artificial." Schreifer v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 289, 291,
391 P.2d 832, 833, 38 Cal. Rptr. 352, 353 (1964); see also Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at 156, 501 P.2d
at 1180, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
13. See infra notes 49, 53-54 & accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 58-59 & accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 64-69 & accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 71-76 & accompanying text.
17. Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at 156, 501 P. 2d at 1180, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 460; see also Horovitz,
Workmen's Compensation: HalfCentury of JudicialDevelopments, 41 NEB. L. REV. 1, 49-52
(1961); Horovitz, Reviews of Leading Current Cases, 14 NAT'L A. CLAIM. COMPEN. ATr'Ys
L.J. 36, 41-44 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Leading Current Cases]; Pound, CurrentArticles of
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criticism of the Rule, it has acknowledged that efforts to rationalize the
determination of an exception to this artificial rule have failed.1 8
Nonetheless, the Rule is vital to the workers' compensation scheme
because it clarifies the basic statutory requirement in the context of employee travel. 19 If the Rule is abrogated, a determination would have to
be made in each employee travel case whether an injury "arose out of
and in the course of employment." The courts' difficulty in construing
the statutory requirement 20 suggests that abrogation of the Rule would
result in even more confusion.
The Rule's greatest shortcoming is that it lacks an underlying rationale that permits a distinction between situations that should be covered by workers' compensation and those that should not.2 1 Although
courts reason that the employment relationship is suspended during the
employee's commute, 22 they have failed to specify the factors that lead to
the conclusion that an employment relationship can exist during certain
commutes. The courts have provided rationales for particular exceptions
to the Rule, but have not proffered one rationale that explains all the
exceptions. 23 This compels a reexamination of the judicial development
and interpretation of the Rule to determine if a single rationale can be
found.
This Note first examines the origin and purpose of the Rule. It then
examines the present exceptions to the Rule. The Note then suggests a
Special Interest: In Workmen's Compensation, 14 NAT'L A. CLAIM. COMPEN. ATr'Ys L.J.
394, 400 (1954); Note, Workmen's Compensation: The Going and Coming Rule and Its Exception in Arkansas, 21 ARK. L. REV. 414, 426 (1967); Note, The Going and Coming Rule, 41
N.D.L. REV. 185, 192-95 (1964); Note, Workmen's Compensation, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 174,
183-84 (1970); Note, Continuing Problems of Travel and Transportation, 1 ST. MARY'S L.J.
89, 94-96 (1969).
18. "The tortuous history of the 'rule,' indeed, writes more than an essay in abstraction;
it is rather the record of a raw issue." Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at 156, 501 P.2d at 1181, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 461; see also Schreifer, 61 Cal. 2d at 291, 391 P.2d at 833, 8306 Cal. Rptr. at 353 (the
Rule is "somewhat arbitrary and artificial").
19. The Rule gives meaning to the statutory requirement by eliminating ordinary commutes from coverage. Cf Judson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 181 Cal. 301, 305,
184 P. 1, 2-3 (1919) (Shaw, J., dissenting) (criticizing the potential broadness of the statutory
requirement and supporting a narrow interpretation of the Rule).
20. See supra note 9 (lengthy discussion of the statutory requirement by commentators
suggests it is a difficult standard to apply).
21. See supra note 12.
22. See, e.g., Zenith Nat'l Ins. Co. v. WCAB, 66 Cal. 2d 944, 947, 428 P.2d 606, 608, 59
Cal. Rptr. 622, 624 (1967) (the Rule's premise is the idea that "the employer-employee relationship lapses during the employee's off-duty absence from the job"); see also Parks v.
WCAB, 33 Cal. 3d 585, 588-89, 660 P.2d 382, 383, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158, 159 (1983); 2 W.
HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(1-2); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 15.12.
23. See infra notes 42-45 & accompanying text.
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Model that explains the rule based on two recognized rationales. The
Model is based on the principle that the employer's premises is the only
intended workplace absent an express agreement to the contrary. The
Model distinguishes travel to the employer's premises from travel to a
secondary worksite. Travel to and from the employer's premises is presumed to be excluded from compensation coverage by the Rule unless
the employer's travel requirements create added risk to the employee.
Travel to a secondary workplace is also presumed to be excluded from
coverage unless the employer makes an express or implied request for the
employee to work at the secondary worksite.
The Note then compares the Model to the Rule and its present exceptions. The Note concludes that the Model is superior to present analysis because it provides objective guidelines that enhance predictability of
results in application of the Rule.
The Going and Coming Rule
The going and coming rule is a judicially created limitation on the
scope of coverage provided by California's workers' compensation. In
the absence of special or extraordinary circumstances, 24 the Rule excludes benefits for injuries occuring during a local commute to and from
a fixed place of business at fixed hours. The Rule also excludes injuries
from travel during unpaid lunch or break periods. 25
The Rule originated in the English courts about the end of the
ninteenth century through their interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act of England. 26 The English Act required that compensable
injuries arise out of and be in the course of employment. 27 One commentator suggests that the Rule emerged in English courts as a part of a
general trend towards simplifying complex laws. 28 It has also been suggested that English courts preferred the Rule because it avoided deciding
each case under the more difficult basic statutory requirement. 29
Because the California Act is patterned after the English Act and
adopted the same basic statutory requirement, the California Supreme
24. Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at 157, 501 P.2d at 1181, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 461.
25. Mission Ins. Co. v. WCAB, 84 Cal. App. 3d 50, 56-57, 148 Cal. Rptr. 292, 295 (1978)
(uncompensated lunchtime travel excluded from coverage by the Rule); see also 2 W. HANNA,
supra note 4, § 9.02(3)(b).

26. Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897, 60 & 61 Vict., ch. 37; see Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at
153-54, 501 P.2d at 1179, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 459; Ocean Accident, 173 Cal. at 317, 159 P. at
1042; see also Leading Current Cases, supra note 17, at 37-38.
27. Ocean Accident, 173 Cal. at 317, 159 P. at 1042.
28.

Leading Current Cases, supra note 17, at 38.

29.

Id.
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Court concluded that the legislature intended to adopt the English
courts' interpretation of the Rule as well. 30 Although it is unclear
whether California courts were motivated by a desire for simplicity or
judicial convenience, there is some indication that the Rule was adopted
3
to prevent expansive interpretation of the basic statutory requirement. '
California courts justify the Rule on the basis that the employment
relationship is suspended during travel away from the employer's premises. 32 Injuries that occur during an employee's commute are considered

34
33
to be common public risks unrelated to employment.
Early cases strictly interpreted the Rule and produced harsh results.
In Ocean Accident and Guarantee Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,3 5 for example, a tugboat employee went ashore on personal business
and returned to the place where the tug had been moored. Unable to find
the tugboat, the employee called out for its location and then followed
the captain's response. While crossing other boats to reach the tugboat's
new mooring, the employee fell to his death. The court denied compensation because the employee had not reached the boat, the place where
his employment services began. 3 6 Subsequent decisions have interpreted
the statutory requirements more broadly so that employees crossing hazardous entryways to the employer's premises would be excepted from the
37
Rule and granted coverage.
Although the Rule initially clarified questions of coverage, the subsequent development of judicially created exceptions have made it diffi-

30. Ocean Accident, 173 Cal. at 317, 159 P. at 1042.
31. See Judson Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 181 Cal. 301, 305, 184 P. 1, 2-3
(1919). Of the three justices who remained on the court after Ocean Accident, two dissented in
Judson Manufacturing and criticized the majority's potentially expansive interpretion of the
statutory requirement. The narrowness of the court's decision in Ocean Accident suggests that
the court was more concerned with limiting the new Act than with achieving simplicity.
32. See supra note 22 & accompanying text.
33. General Ins. Co. of Am. v. WCAB, 16 Cal. 3d 595, 601, 546 P.2d 1360, 1363, 128
Cal. Rptr. 417, 419 (1976) (risk of crossing a street is common to the public, therefore, no
special risk exception is created); see infra notes 116-18 & accompanying text; see also Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at 157, 501 P.2d at 1181, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 461 (risk of riding a public bus to
work is not compensable).
34. See generally 2 W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(1).
35. 173 Cal. 313, 314-15, 159 P. 1041, 1041 (1916).
36. Id. at 322, 159 P. at 1044.
37. Three years later, the Judson Manufacturing court criticized the sweeping dictum in
Ocean Accident that all injuries while going to or returning from work are excluded from
benefits. The court implied that such strict interpretation when applied to hazardous entryways resulted in a "harsh and indefensible" outcome. 181 Cal. at 302-03, 184 P. at 2; see
also Parks v. WCAB, 33 Cal. 3d 585, 585 n.4, 660 P.2d 382, 384 n.4, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158, 160
n.4 (modern criticism of the Rule by New Hampshire courts described as "harsh").
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cult to apply. 3 8 Indeed, critics suggest that the numerous exceptions
39
have in fact swallowed the Rule.
Exceptions to the Rule
Courts recognize exceptions to the Rule when special circumstances
exist. The exceptions are determined on a case by case basis, rather than
in accordance with broader principles. 4° There are, however, three basic
fact patterns that most often lead a court to recognize an exception to the
Rule:41 when the workplace has been physically extended in some way;
when the employer pays wages or substantial expenses to the employee
for the travel; and when the employer requires the travel. These categories provide a convenient conceptual basis to differentiate the exceptions
and the special circumstances underlying them.
Courts invoke several rationales to justify including otherwise excepted travel within the statutory requirement. Generally, an exception is
warranted when the injury occurred: during actual service to the employer; 42 during employer control over the employee's actions; 43 from
special employment risks to the employee;44 or on property closely associated with the employment. 45
38. " 'The going and coming' rule which appears simple on its face has been difficult in
practice to apply." Parks, 33 Cal. 3d at 589, 660 P.2d at 384, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 160.
39. "[E]xceptions have obliterated the rule, but continuing to focus on the artificially
perpetrated 'rule' and its categories of exceptions causes the board and the courts to lose sight
of the [statutory requirement]." Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at 156 n.5, 501 P.2d at 1180 n.5, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 460 n.5 (summarizing criticisms of the Rule).
40. See generally 2 W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.02-9.04 (classfies the exceptions into
broad categories, but concentrates mainly on the facts which generate exceptions). 1 S.HERLICK, supra note 4, § 10.14-10.20 (identifies five categories); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 9,
§§ 15.13.-19.63 (discusses numerous factual patterns under the Rule). Classification based on
facts is probably a result of the court's analytical approach: "Whether an employee has entered into the areas of his employment involves a factual determination to be made in light of
the circumstances in the case." Parks, 33 Cal. 3d at 589 n.5, 660 P.2d at 160 n.5, 190 Cal.
Rptr. at 160 n.5; see also Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at 154-55, 501 P.2d at 1179-80, 104 Cal. Rptr. at
459-60.
41. This classification closely reflects that of 2 W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(4), but
includes extensions of the premises, which Hanna treats separately. Id. § 9.04(2).
42. Ocean Accident, 173 Cal. at 322, 159 P. at 1044; Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at 154-55, 501
P.2d at 1179-80, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 459-60.
43. Wilson v. WCAB, 16 Cal. 3d 181, 185, 545 P.2d 225, 227, 127 Cal. Rptr. 313, 315
(1976) (employer requirements that call for a special route or mode, or increase the risk of
injury); Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at 157, 501 P.2d at 1181, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 461 (employer requirements that remove the transit from the employee's choice).
44. Wilson, 16 Cal. 3d at 185, 545 P.2d at 227, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 315 (increased risk from
means of transit); Parks, 33 Cal. 3d at 589, 660 P.2d at 384, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 160 ("special
risks" beyond the premises).
45. Injuries occurring within the "reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be
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Although courts often use these rationales, none is considered essential to finding an exception to the Rule. 46 Instead, the courts evaluate all

the facts and circumstances to determine whether the Rule applies. 4 7 As
a result, the exceptions often appear to be based on appealing facts rather
than any clear standard or rationale. 48 The courts' responsiveness to
compelling or sympathetic facts and circumstances becomes more apparent upon examining the broad categories of exceptions. The recurring
theme throughout the following discussion is that the exceptions reflect
special circumstances, which in some way establish that the statutory
requirement is met.
Extended Premises
An injury that takes place on property other than the employer's
premises comes within the Rule, and is therefore noncompensable unless
the injury occurs: on a hazardous entryway to the premises; 49 between
two work premises; 50 or in a vehicle provided by the employer. 5 1 Extended premises exceptions modified earlier interpretations of the Rule
used in passing to and from the place" of work are excepted from the Rule. Lewis v. WCAB,
15 Cal. 3d 559, 561-62, 542 P.2d 225, 226, 125 Cal. Rptr. 353, 354 (1975) (returning to public
property between an employer-owned parking lot and premises).
46. Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at 154-55, 501 P.2d at 1179-80, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 459-60 (rejecting
a requirement for service); Smith v. WCAB, 69 Cal. 2d 814, 821, 447 P.2d 365, 370, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 253, 258 (1968) (rejecting a requirement for employer control); Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
WCAB, 104 Cal. App. 3d 528, 538 n.5, 163 Cal. Rptr. 750, 756 n.5 (1980) (rejecting a risk
requirement).
47.

See supra note 40.

48. " 'Special' errand [or mission] is probably no more than a designation for appealing
facts. The difficult question, of course, is what fact or facts have been critical in moving a
court to invoke ... [the] exception." Note, The Special ErrandException, 6 STAN. L. REV.
383, 389 (1954).
49. Parks, 33 Cal. 3d at 592-93, 660 P.2d at 386-87, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63 (crossing
school children subjected teacher to risk of criminal assault); Greydanus v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 63 Cal. 2d 490, 492, 407 P.2d 296, 299, 47 Cal. Rptr. 384, 387 (1965) (hazardous left
turn to enter the premises); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 329,
336, 170 P.2d 18, 23 (1946); Friere v. Matson Nay. Co., 19 Cal. 2d 8, 12-13, 118 P.2d 809, 812
(1941) (employer created hazards on adjacent bulkhead by the movement of vehicles); Judson
Mfg. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 181 Cal. 301, 301-02, 184 P. 1, 1 (1919) (crossing railroad tracts adjacent to premises); Lefebvre v. WCAB, 106 Cal. App. 3d 745, 750-51, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 246, 249 (1980) (loose gravel on the employer's usual entrance required alternative entry); see generally 2 W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9-04(b); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 15.31.
50. Lewis, 15 Cal. 3d at 563, 542 P.2d at 227, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 355 (between employer
parking lot and premises). The exception also applies to travel between work and home when
the employee's home is a second worksite. Wilson, 16 Cal. 3d at 184, 545 P.2d at 226-27, 127
Cal. Rptr. at 314-15. See generally 2 W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(2)(b)(ii); 1 A. LARSON,
supra note 9, § 18.32.
51. Harlan v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 194 Cal. 352, 356, 228 P. 654, 656 (1924)
(employer furnished the vehicle so employee could travel between premises).
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52
that required the employee to be on the employer's premises.
Hazardous entryways can be caused by the physical nature of the
premises, or by hazards emanating from the premises that "spill over"
past the premises line. Courts generally refer to such cases as falling
under the "special risk exception." The special risk exception requires
the employee to show that, but for the employment, the employee would
not have been at the location where the injury occurred and that the risk
is unique to the workplace, or is greater than risks common to the public. 5 3 For example, courts have found a special risk when an employee
must make a left-hand turn across traffic in order to enter the employer's
54
premises.
A special risk exception also is recognized when conditions of employment facilitate a criminal assault. In Parks v. WCAB, 55 a teacher
was criminally assaulted and injured in her car after leaving the school
parking lot. The court found that school children crossing the street frequently blocked traffic, which created an opportunity for the attack. The
court reasoned that the teacher was entitled to compensation because the
employment regularly exposed the teacher to the special risk of being
56
delayed by school children and, thus, vulnerable to attack.
Other extended premises exceptions are recognized for employees
injured while traveling between two employer premises, including the
employee's home when it is a second workplace,5 7 or when the employee
is injured on employer-provided transportation. In Lewis v. WCAB, 58 an
employee injured on public property between the employer's parking lot
and the actual premises was granted compensation. The court reasoned
that when an employer divides the work premises, travel on public property between the premises does not interrupt the employment relationship.5 9 Furthermore, injuries on employer-provided transportation are
treated as though they occurred on the employer's premises. Courts consider such employer-provided transportation as creating "mobile" or

52. Ocean Accident, 173 Cal. at 322, 159 P. at 1044; see supra notes 35-37 & accompanying text.
53. Parks, 33 Cal. 3d at 590, 660 P.2d at 384-85, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 161 (reaffirming the
GeneralInsurance Co. ofAmerica test); GeneralIns. Co. ofAr., 16 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 546 P.2d

at 1363-64, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 419-20 (establishing the test).
54. Greydanus, 63 Cal. 2d at 492, 407 P.2d at 299, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
55. 33 Cal. 3d 585, 592-93, 660 P.2d 382, 386-87, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158, 162-63 (1983).
56. Id.
57. Wilson, 16 Cal. 3d at 184, 545 P.2d at 226-27, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 314-15 (making the
home a second worksite warrants an exception from the Rule).
58. 15 Cal. 3d 559, 560-61, 542 P.2d 225, 225-26, 125 Cal. Rptr. 353, 353-54 (1975).
59. Id. at 565, 542 P.2d at 229, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
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"floating" premises. 60
Courts justify the extended premises exceptions by finding that the
injury occurred on property closely associated with the premises, 6' or
that the employer created a special risk that resulted in a "zone of danger" around the premises. 62 Those exceptions have blurred the definition
of "premises," the point at which the employment relationship tradition6
ally has begun.

3

Payment of Wages or Substantial Expenses

Courts find an exception to the Rule when the employer pays
wages 64 or substantial travel expenses 65 for employee travel. Such con-

duct is viewed as establishing the employer's intent to continue the employment relationship beyond the premises. 66 If the payment is only for
travel expenses, courts require that the payment be substantial enough to
67
act as an inducement for the employee to work at a distant worksite.
Thus, a construction worker who received a travel allowance to compen68
sate him for working at a distant worksite was excepted from the Rule,
while an employee who received a small travel allowance for bus fare
pursuant to a union contract was excluded from coverage. 69 Courts justify this exception on the basis that wages or substantial travel expenses
60. Joyner v. WCAB, 266 Cal. App. 2d 470, 473, 72 Cal. Rptr. 132, 134 (1968) (employee's truck used to handle employer's equipment consituted a "mobile shop"); see also 2 W.
HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(4)(d); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 17.00-17.10, 17.40.
61. See supra note 45.
62. Parks, 33 Cal. 3d at 592-93, 660 P.2d at 386-87, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63.
63. GeneralIns. Co. of Am., 16 Cal. 3d at 599, 546 P.2d at 1363, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
64. Rankin v. WCAB, 17 Cal. App. 3d 857, 861-62, 95 Cal. Rptr. 275, 277-78 (1971)
(exception found for injury during brief trip to an off-premises sandwich shop when employer
agreed to allow employee to make up time owed by working through the lunch hour); Western
Greyhound Lines v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 225 Cal. App. 2d 517, 521, 37 Cal. Rptr.
580, 582 (1964) (injury at an off-premises cafe during paid break); Western Pipe & Steel Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 49 Cal. App. 2d 108, 113, 121 P.2d 35, 38-39 (1942) (travel
during paid dinner break); see generally 2 W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(4)(b-c); 1 A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 16.20-30.
65. Zenith Nat'l Ins. Co. v. WCAB, 66 Cal. 2d 944, 948, 428 P.2d 606, 609, 59 Cal. Rptr.
622, 625 (1967); see generally 2 W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(4)(b).
66. "When the employer pays the employee at an hourly rate during... meal[s]. . . the
employer has impliedly agreed that service will continue." Western Pipe & Steel Co., 49 Cal.
App. 2d at 112, 121 P.2d at 38.
67. Zenith Nat'l Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d at 948, 428 P.2d at 609, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
68. Id.
69. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 239 Cal. App. 2d 533,
536-37, 48 Cal. Rptr. 758, 760-61 (1966). But see City & County of San Francisco v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 61 Cal. App. 2d 248, 250-51, 142 P.2d 760, 761-62 (1943) (free travel
passes on the "Muni" warranted exception because the employer also conrolled the
conveyance).
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70
entitle the employer to services by or control over the employee.

Employer Required Travel
An employee travelling at the employer's express or implied request
to perform work is not excluded from coverage by the Rule. This broad
exception is difficult to apply because employer requirements involve a
variety of situations, and proof of implied requirements poses evidentary
problems. Furthermore, courts utilize different standards depending on
whether the activity is ongoing or infrequent. Ongoing activities are excepted from the Rule when the employee engages in conduct that is reasonably directed toward the fulfillment of an express or implied employer
71
requirement and is performed for the employer's benefit and advantage.
In contrast, when the activity is infrequent, courts consider whether the
"special mission" exception applies. An employee's conduct is "special"
if it is extraordinary in relationship to routine duties and is not outside
the scope of employment. 72 Although no clear standard exists, merely
reporting early or staying late at work is not special, 73 nor is mailing a
business letter while enroute home. 74 Generally, special activities include
those that require the use of the home as a second workplace, a car, or a
special route, or that increase the risk of employee injury. 75 The courts'
inquiry is further complicated because the exception can be based on evidence of an infrequent or a one-time implied employer request. No clear
76
standard exists to determine when facts support such an exception.
Thus, the employer-required travel exception can be divided into
four situations based on whether the employer request is: express ongoing; implied ongoing; express infrequent; or implied infrequent. By con70.

Western GreyhoundLines, 225 Cal. App. 2d at 520-21, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 582; Western

Pipe & Steel Co., 49 Cal. App. 2d at 112, 121 P.2d at 38.
71. Smith v. WCAB, 69 Cal. 2d 814, 820, 447 P.2d 365, 369, 73 Cal. Rptr. 253, 257
(1968). As related to traveling salesmen, see Wiseman v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 46 Cal.
2d 570, 573, 297 P.2d 649, 650-51 (1956) ("commercial traveler" exception held for employee
in a distant city who died in a fire in his hotel room); see generally 2 W. HANNA, supra note 4,
§ 9.03(1)(d).
72. GeneralIn Co. of Am., 16 Cal. 3d at 601, 546 P.2d at 1364, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
73. Id.
74. Humphry v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 4 Cal. App. 2d 589, 593-95, 41 P.2d 208, 210
(1935) (no special mission found to make employer vicariously liable in tort when employee is
mailing employer reports).
75. Wilson v. WCAB, 16 Cal. 3d 181, 184-85, 545 P.2d 225, 226-27, 127 Cal. Rptr. 313,
314-15 (1976). The use of the home as a secondary worksite is generally considered independent of the special mission exception. Such a requirement is nontheless subject to the special
standard generally stated by the Rule. See supra notes 24-25, 58-60 & accompanying text.
76. See generally2 W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(4)(b) (Hanna treats the issue of "special" service as a question of whether the service is "substantial").
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sidering several cases under these categories, the present approaches to
applying the Rule can be better understood.
Express Ongoing Requirements
In Smith v. WCAB, 77 the court held that an exception to the Rule
exists when an employee engages in ongoing conduct pursuant to the
employer's express request. In that case, a social worker was killed during a morning commute to the office. The worker's supervisor expressly
required each social worker to furnish a car to facilitate visiting clients.
The court held that an employee who furnishes a vehicle for an employer's use pursuant to a supervisor's request fulfills an employment
condition when transporting the vehicle to work. 78 The court reasoned
that an exception to the Rule was justified because the employee was
engaged in conduct for the employer's benefit and advantage, which was
reasonably directed toward the fulfillment of the employer's requirement. 7 9 This conclusion was reached despite evidence that the employer's regulations did not require social workers to provide a car, and
that the employer had pool cars available for the employee's use. 80
Similarly, an exception exists for uniformed police officers injured
while commuting to work when police department rules expressly require the officer to wear a uniform and to respond to emergencies while
wearing the uniform, and when the employer does not provide changing
facilities at work. For example, in Garzoli v. WCAB,81 the court found
an exception for a uniformed police officer who was killed in a motorcycle crash while commuting home. The evidence showed that the officer
had a duty to respond to emergencies while in uniform, and that the
police station did not have adequate changing facilities. 82 Despite the
fact that the officer was not required to furnish a vehicle, the court found
that the employer's requirement regarding uniforms had the effect of
placing the officer in service whenever the officer was "conspicuously"
83
travelling on public streets.
Subsequent cases extended the exception to police officers travelling
77. 69 Cal. 2d 814, 816-18, 447 P.2d 365, 367-68, 73 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255-56 (1968).
78. Id. at 825, 447 P.2d at 373, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
79. Id. at 820, 447 P.2d at 369, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 257. Courts refer to this as the Smith
exception.
80. Id. at 817, 447 P.2d at 367, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
81. 2 Cal. 3d 502, 504-05, 467 P.2d 833, 833-34, 86 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1970).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 506, 467 P.2d at 835, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 3. The court found the circumstances to
be a reasonable extension of the exception in Smith. Id.; see supra note 79 & accompanying
text.
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in unmarked cars, thereby eliminating the need for "conspicuous" uniformed travel.84 A recent case, Carrillov. WCAB, 85 applied the exception when a uniformed police officer was enroute to work in her personal
car, as she was on "unmarked patrol."
In all of the uniformed police officer cases, the lack of an employerprovided changing facility prompted the officer to change at home in order to meet the employer's requirement of wearing a uniform. 86 Thus, in
State Compensation InsuranceFund v. WCAB, 87 a police officer commuting to work in uniform was denied benefits because changing facilities
were available at the police station. The court reasoned that the officer
wore the uniform for his own convenience, not as a requirement of his
employment.88
In contrast to the police cases, the court in Baroid v. WCAB 89 de-

nied an exception to an oil well worker on twenty-four hour call who was
seriously injured during a morning commute. The court denied coverage
even though the employee was required to carry an "air page beeper"
while commuting. The court did not consider whether the worker had a
duty to respond to emergencies as in the police cases. 90 Instead, the
court required the employee to show that the early morning commute
was a "special mission" at the immediate request of the employer.9 1
These cases indicate that even when an express ongoing employer
requirement exists, courts are not guided by clear principles in applying
84. Guest v. WCAB, 2 Cal. 3d 670, 674, 470 P.2d 1, 3, 87 Cal. Rptr. 193, 195 (1970). In
Guest, an exception was found for a uniformed officer who was injured while commuting in a
personal car to a temporary worksite. Although the police station had a changing facility, the
court found changing at home reasonable because the officer was told to report directly to the
temporary assignment, and the officer was uncertain whether a changing facility was available
there. Id.
85. 149 Cal. App. 3d 1177, 1180-81, 197 Cal. Rptr. 425, 428 (1983).
86. Guest, 2 Cal. 3d at 672, 470 P.2d at 2, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 193-94; Garzoli, 2 Cal. 3d at
504, 467 P.2d at 834, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 2; Carrillo, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 1178, 197 Cal. Rptr. at
426.
87. 29 Cal. App. 3d 902, 907-08, 106 Cal. Rptr. 39, 42 (1973).
88. One recent Workers'Compensation Appeals Board case involved a husband and wife,
who were both uniformed sheriffs deputies. They were injured during an ordinary commute.
The Board found in favor of the wife based on a lack of changing facilities for women, but
found against the husband because changing facilities were available for men. County of Monterey v. WCAB, 48 Cal. Comp. Cas. (MB) 714 (1983); Graham v. WCAB, 48 Cal. Comp. Cas.
(MB) 714 (1983); see 2 W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(4)(f)(ii) (criticizing the availability of
changing facilities as the determinative factor, preferring the standard to be whether the employee had a duty to render assistance).
89. 121 Cal. App. 3d 558, 563-64, 175 Cal Rptr. 633, 635 (1981).
90. The opinion does refer to the police cases, but only establishes that 24 hour on-call
status does not create an exception to the Rule. Id. at 566, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
91. Id. at 574, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 642.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36

the Rule. This becomes even more evident in cases in which the employer makes an implied requirement.
Implied Ongoing Requirements
In Hinojosa v. WCAB, 92 the court recognized an exception for a
farmworker who was injured enroute home while a passenger in a coworker's vehicle. The court found that, by requiring employees to travel
between noncontiguous farms during the workday, the employer had
made an implied request that employees provide vehicles. 9 3 The court
reasoned that the employer's failure to provide transportation between
worksites made the employee-provided vehicle a necessary part of the
employment environment. 94 The court further reasoned that the employer benefited by this implied requirement because the employee was
95
compelled to provide a car and risk the hazards of private motor travel.
In this respect, the California Supreme Court for the first time explained
the allocation of liability under the Rule as a balance of interests:
The interest of the employer lies in his desire to be immune from
liability for the employee's injury or death that occurs in the everyday
transit from home to office or plant; the contrary interest of the employee lies in his desire to be protected from loss by injury or death
that occurs in the non-routine transit, or results from the means of
transit or the use of a car undertaken
for the employer for his benefit at
96
his direct or implied request.
Although most courts have not expressly utilized a balance of interests
analysis, the approach the courts have taken has been to focus on identifying special factors that create a non-routine commute or imply the use
97
of a car.
Despite this balance of interests analysis, courts refuse to recognize
an exception for travel associated with the "personal comfort" doctrine.
That doctrine provides coverage for injuries that occur during breaks and
92. 8 Cal. 3d 150, 162, 501 P.2d 1176, 1185, 104 Cal. Rptr. 456, 465 (1972).
93. Id. at 161-62, 501 P.2d at 1184, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
94. Id. at 160, 501 P.2d at 1183, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
95. Id. at 157, 501 P.2d at 1181, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 461. Furthermore, the court found it
immaterial that Hinojosa was a passenger in a carpool arrangement. The worker providing the
vehicle and one passenger who shared the expense were excepted from the Rule. Id. at 162,
501 P.2d at 1184-85, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 464-65.
96. Id. at 156-57, 501 P.2d at 1181, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 461.
97. See, e.g., Dimming v. WCAB, 6 Cal. 3d 860, 495 P.2d 433, 1016 Cal. Rptr. 105
(1972). In Dimming, an exception was found for an employee injured while returning home
from night college classes paid for by the employer. The court held that the employer's ongoing implied invitation was evidenced by reimbursements, which made the travel "special." Id.
at 869, 495 P.2d at 439, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
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lunches, but only if the injury occurs on the employer's premises. 98
Courts reason that a mutual benefit exists: the employee benefits by gaining personal comfort and the employer benefits by gaining increased employee efficiency. 9 9 Nonetheless, courts view lunch or other breaks off the
premises as a suspension or abandonment of the employment relationship identical to ordinary commuting. 1°°
For example, in Mission Insurance Co. v. WCAB,10 1 the court refused to grant an exception from the Rule when the employee was injured in an automobile accident during an uncompensated lunch period.
Although the employer provided a lunchroom, the facility did not serve
food. 102 The court reasoned that employee's lunchtime travel provided
no greater benefit to the employer than if the employee ate lunch on the
premises.10 3 The court reasoned that travel during the lunch period was
beyond the control of the employer and no different from an ordinary
commute. 104
The courts' analysis of implied ongoing requirements shows that the
exception will be found only when the employer's requirement is very
clear, and the requirement makes the commute non-routine or requires
the employee to provide a car. Moreover, while courts treat the personal
comfort doctrine as creating an implied-in-law employer requirement,
they have not created an exception for lunchtime travel. The resulting
ambiguities concerning the factors that constitute an implied employer
requirement and that determine whether travel is non-routine, make the
outcome under the Rule difficult to predict.
Express Infrequent Requirements

A similar and even greater ambiguity occurs when the employer
makes an infrequent requirement. These cases are generally analyzed
under the "special mission" standard. If an employee is on a "special
98. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. WCAB, 67 Cal. 2d 925, 928, 434 P.2d 619, 621, 64
Cal. Rptr. 323, 325 (1967).
99. Id.; see also 2 W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.02(2).
100. Exceptions for lunch or break activities have been recognized only when the employee is paid during such breaks. See, eg., Duncan v. WCAB, 150 Cal. App. 3d 117, 120-21,
197 Cal. Rptr. 474, 476-77 (1983) (court inferred that a salaried employee is paid equally over
the entire workday; therefore, injury during a lunch break occurred on paid time). But see
County of Los Angeles v. WCAB, 145 Cal. App. 3d 418, 422-23, 193 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376-77
(1983) (exception denied for an employee who rearranged two paid breaks to lengthen an
unpaid lunch break).
101. 84 Cal. App. 3d 50, 57, 148 Cal. Rptr. 292, 296 (1978).
102. Id. at 52, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
103. Id. at 56, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
104.

Id.
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mission" when injured, the Rule is inapplicable. An employee is on a
"special mission" if his conduct is extraordinary in relationship to routine duties and is not outside the scope of employment. 0 5
For example, in Schreifer v. Industrial Accident Commission 10 6 a
deputy sheriff was injured while enroute to work six hours before a
scheduled shift, pursuant to his employer's request to report for special
enforcement detail at that time. Even though the employee was on
twenty-four hour call and customarily worked irregular hours, the court
held that the deputy sheriffs commute was a "special mission" because it
07
was extraordinary in relationship to the deputy sheriffs routine duties.
A similar exception was found in Safeway Stores, Inc. v. WCAB, 10 8
in which an employee was injured by an unknown assailant while walking from his car to his home after completing a doubletime shift at his
employer's request. The employer's request for overtime work constituted a special mission by the employee because the request was unusual
and the journey home was a "foreseeable and essential part of the special
service which an employee is called to perform.

...
109 The court held

that the special mission ended only when the employee was no longer
"exposed to the public.""10
In contrast, the court in Arboleda v. WCAB" found that the special
mission exception did not apply to an employee who travelled home to
eat before returning to work overtime pursuant to the employer's request. The court stated that the trip was not "special," even though the
employer's requirement imposed the burden of "two round trips" on the
2
employee. "1
The case law is not clear about when reporting early or staying late
gives rise to an exception. A possible interpretation of these cases is that
travel resulting from a sudden or unusual change in work schedule involves a "special mission," while travel resulting from the employee's
3
normal work schedule does not."
105. See supra notes 72-76 & accompanying text.
106. 61 Cal. 2d 289, 294-95, 391 P.2d 832, 835, 38 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355 (1964).
107. Id.; see also Los Angeles Jewish Community Council v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
94 Cal. App. 2d 65, 69, 209 P.2d 991, 993 (1949) (special mission exception was found to apply
when a Rabbi made an evening trip to his workplace to do work that fell within his regular
daytime duties, but that was extraordinary for evening work).
108. 104 Cal. App. 3d 528, 531, 163 Cal. Rptr. 750, 751-52 (1980).
109. Id. at 537, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
110. Id. at 538, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
111. 253 Cal. App. 2d 481, 485-86, 61 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508 (1967).
112. Id. at 486, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09.
113. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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Implied Infrequent Requirements
The "special mission" standard is most difficult to apply in cases
when the employer implicitly requires the employee to travel. First, the
court must determine whether an employment relationship exists. When
coupled with the ambiguity of the "special mission" standard, the results
are difficult to predict. Additionally, in two of the following cases, the
courts considered whether the employer's requirements to use the home
warrants an exception based on travel to a second worksite . 114 At this
point, the courts determined whether the required travel was a special or
extraordinary circumstance.' 5
For example, in GeneralInsurance Co. of America v. WCAB 116 no
exception to the Rule was found when an employee who regularly arrived at work early to prepare coffee for his co-workers was injured during his commute to work. Although the employer provided coffee
supplies and acquiesced in the activity, the court held that the employer
117
did not require the employee to report early to prepare the coffee.
Rather, the court found that the employee acted upon his own volition
and not at the employer's request. Thus, the employee's early arrival to
prepare coffee did not "turn the ordinary commute into a special mission
warranting exception from the going and coming rule."1 1 8
In Wilson v. WCAB, 119 no exception was found to apply when a
teacher was injured while commuting to work and transporting materials
prepared at home for classroom use. In this case, the court considered
whether the circumstances of employment either created a secondary
worksite in the employee's home or established an exceptional situation
20
because a car was necessary to transport the work-related materials.
114.
115.

See supra notes 50, 57, 75 & accompanying text.
Wilson v. WCAB, 16 Cal. 3d 181, 184-85, 545 P.2d 225, 226-27, 127 Cal. Rptr. 313,

314-15 (1975).
116.

16 Cal. 3d 595, 602, 546 P.2d 1361, 1365, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417, 421 (1976).

117. Id. at 601, 546 P.2d at 1364, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
118. Id. at 601-602, 546 P.2d at 1364-65, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 420-21. In contrast, the dissent
found that the preparation of coffee fell within the "special mission" exception because the
going and coming rule does not apply to "[p]erformance at a special time of a service routinely
performed by employees during the normal work day." Id at 603, 546 P.2d at 1366, 128 Cal.
Rptr. at 422 (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting); see also supra note 107 & accompanying text. Furthermore, because the employer expressly sanctioned the activity and was benefited by it, the dis-

sent found that the employee was active "with the express or implied permission of the
employer" and the activity, therefore, fell within the "special mission" limitation. General Ins.
Co. of Am., 16 Cal. at 604, 546 P.2d at 1366, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 422 (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting).
119.

16 Cal. 3d 181, 185, 545 P.2d 225, 227, 127 Cal. Rptr. 313, 315 (1976).

120. Although the court did not apply the special mission test, it stated that an exception
to the going and coming rule would be found when the work-related materials required a
special route or mode of transportation, or increased the employee's risk of injury. Id.
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Despite the fact that the employer encouraged teachers to prepare special
projects at home, the court held that the employer did not require teachers to work at home.1 21 The court reasoned that "this hearth side activity-while commendable--does not create a white-collar exception to the
going and coming rule."1 2 2 This conclusion was further supported by
evidence indicating that other teachers used school facilities to complete
their preparatory chores rather than using their home. 123 The court
noted that the facilities were not proved to be insufficient to complete the
employer-required tasks. 124 Furthermore, the court concluded that special circumstances had not been established because the transportation of
work-related materials did not require the use of a car or increase the risk
of injury to the employee.12 5 The court viewed such "cartage" as common and incidental to the commute rather than as part of the employ-

ment.

126

In contrast, the court in Bramall v. WCAB1 27 held that an exception
to the Rule existed when a legal secretary who took a deposition home
for translation was injured during the commute on the ground that the
home was an implied secondary worksite. Evidence showed that the employer had permitted taking work home in the past, but had not required
the employee to do so on the date in question. 28 Even though the employee admitted that her purpose in going home was to fix dinner for her
family, the court found that a concurrent business motivation existed for
the trip and, therefore, the trip fell within the "dual purpose exception"
to the Rule.129 The dual purpose exception applies when the employer's
implicit requirement to travel home to do work coincides with the employee's ordinary commute or personal convenience. 130 The court identi121. Id. at 184-85, 545 P.2d at 226-27, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 314-15; see infra note 194 (distinction between employer requirements and professional responsibilities).
122. Wilson, 16 Cal. 3d at 185, 545 P.2d at 227, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 78 Cal. App. 3d 151, 160, 144 Cal. Rptr. 105, 110 (1978).
128. Id. at 158, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
129. Id. at 157-58, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 108-09.
130. Id. One commentator described the rationale for this exception:
The essence of the dual purpose trip is that the business pursuits of the employer and
the personal interests of the employee are combined. The essence of the special mission is that the bother and effort of the special trip become part of the employee's
employment. There need not be any extra effort, bother, or inconvenience on the
dual purpose trip . . . . the test for compensability is whether or not the employee
was doing those things which the contract of employment either expressly or impliedly authorized the employee to do.
I W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(4)(h).
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fled several factors in that case that indicated an implied employer
request to use the home as a secondary worksite: the employer expected
the work to be completed by the next day even if overtime was required;
the employer knew that work was regularly taken home by the employee;
if the employee had asked to take the work home, the employer would
have consented; the employee took compensating time off to make up for
the time worked at home; and the distracting atmosphere of the office
after five p.m. precluded the proper performance of the employee's duties. 131 The court concluded that the employer had implicitly requested
the employee to use her home as a secondary worksite; thus, travel be132
tween it and the office was excepted from the Rule.
These decisions demonstrate the difficulty in determining when an
implied employer request falls within an exception to the Rule. In particular, these cases do not clarify when arriving early or working overtime
constitutes an implied request by the employer to work at a secondary
worksite.
In summary, the Rule presently distinguishes ongoing employer-required travel from infrequent employer-required travel. While the ongoing requirements must reasonably fulfill employer requests, infrequent
requirements must satisfy the special mission exception or the dual purpose exception. For one of these exceptions to apply, the court generally
will require the presence of special circumstances surrounding the employer's request. When the required duties are routine, an exception will
not be found. 133 Although implicit requirements can support an exception, the decision in Wilson suggests that an implied employer requirement without more is insufficient to support an exception to the going
and coming rule.134
Criticism of the Rule
1 35
Practical application of the going and coming Rule is difficult.

131. 78 Cal. App. 3d at 158-59, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10.
132. Id. at 160, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 110. The court did not consider whether a car was
necessary to transport the translation materials because the issue was not raised in this case.

Id. at 610 n.2, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 110 n.2.
133.

GeneralIns. Co. of Am., 16 Cal. 3d at 601, 546 P.2d at 1364, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 420.

134. Bramall is distinguishable because the employee's taking compensated time-off to
make up for the time worked at home "militate[d] in favor of the conclusion that the home was

a second jobsite." 78 Cal. App. 3d at 159, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 110. Moreover, the employer's
testimony was unusual in that it essentially admitted an implied requirement to work at home.
Id. at 158:59, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10. What factors the court wil require when the employer

is less amiable, as in Wilson, is an open question.
135.

(1983).

Parks v. WCAB, 33 Cal. 3d 585, 589, 660 P.2d 382, 384, 190 Cal. Rptr. 158, 160
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Courts and commentators fault the arbitrary and artificial nature of the
Rule, which necessarily results in its numerous exceptions.' 3 6 Some
courts argue that the "premises line" must be strictly drawn because
otherwise there is no objective standard to ascertain the point at which
employment begins.' 37 This criticism, however, only applies to the extended premises exceptions. 138 Much of the difficulty in applying the
Rule stems from its numerous exceptions, which attempt to identify the
factors necessary to find that an employment relationship exists during
employee travel.
Two solutions have been proposed. First, at least one commentator
suggests that the Rule has been "swallowed up" by its exceptions and
that courts should abrogate it in favor of the statutory requirement that
'3 9
the employee's injury arise "out of and in the course of employment."'
However, if the Rule is abrogated it is unlikely that application of the
statutory requirement alone would result in more consistent decisions.
Courts would then be faced with the problem of determining whether the
injury arose "out of and in the course of employment." Since the statutory requirement underpins the exceptions, it is doubtful whether abrogation of the Rule would significantly improve predictability of results.14°
Another commentator has suggested codification of the present
form of the Rule and its exceptions.' 4 ' Although this solution might
make interpretation of the Rule more uniform, it would not resolve the
basic conceptual problem of rationalizing the effect of the Rule in limiting benefits.
Most notably, the Rule lacks a consistent rationale underlying its
exceptions. Without a consistent rationale, courts are prone to reach decisions based on appealing fact situations that may be deemed "special
circumstances."' 42 Such flexibility arguably is desirable to achieve the
136. Schreifer v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 289, 291, 391 P.2d 832, 833, 38
Cal. Rptr. 352, 353 (1964).
137. See, e.g., GeneralIns. Co. of Am., 16 Cal. 3d at 599, 546 P.2d at 1363, 128 Cal. Rptr.
at 419; Mission Ins. Co. v. WCAB, 84 Cal. App. 3d 50, 57, 148 Cal. Rptr. 292, 296 (1978).
Both opinions favorably cite Professor Larson's criticism that extending the "premises line" to
cover "hard cases" will substitute a subjective standard for what is now "a sharp, objective
[but] perhaps . . . arbitrary line." See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 15.12(a).
138. See supra notes 49-63 & accompanying text. Because extended premises exceptions
generally involve the property adjacent to the premises, the "premises line" standard is of little
use in analyzing cases involving employer required travel.
139. Leading Current Cases, supra note 17, at 41-44.
140. See supra notes 19-20 & accompanying text.
141. Bouret, The CaliforniaGoing and Coming Rule: A Plea for Legislative Clarification,
15 CAL. W.L. REV. 16 (1979).
142. "Indeed, the evasion of the going and coming rule by arbitrary exceptions based upon
impertinent facts does injustice to those workers whose injuries come within the going and
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Act's policy of liberally construing its provisions in favor of the employee; 14 3 however, unguided flexibility leads to inconsistent results and
uncertainty as to when an injury is compensable.
The confusion surrounding the Rule disserves the Act's fundamental purpose of providing a speedy and adequate remedy to injured employees. 144 Rather than simplifying the statutory requirement to
facilitate understanding and expedite fair settlements, the present interpretation of the Rule encourages inequitable compromises and unnecessary litigation.
This Note suggests that instead of abrogating or codifying the Rule,
a reconsideration of the case law applying the Rule reveals a latent comprehensive rationale underlying it. Once discerned, this rationale makes
application of the Rule far simpler.

The Model
In order to preserve the Rule, this Note suggests a Model that reflects how courts currently treat different employee travel situations.
This Model is composed of a basic principle and two mutually exclusive
presumptions. The basic principle is that the employer's premises are the
sole intended workplace absent an express or implied contrary agreement, payment of wages, or substantial travel expenses. Absent one of
these conditions, an employee is within the scope of the Rule for any
travel injury unless he can rebut either of two mutually exclusive presumptions. The first presumption is that travel which only involves work
to be done on the employer's premises is presumed to be an ordinary
commute unless added risk of injury exists. This presumption reflects
the employee's interest in protection from non-routine travel. 14 5 The second presumption is that travel which involves work at secondary workplaces 146 is excluded from compensation coverage by the Rule unless
there is an express employer requirement to work there, or an implied
coming rule because they cannot point to any 'unusual' fact about their journey to or from
work." Baroid v. WCAB, 121 Cal. App. 3d 558, 573, 175 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641 (1981).
143. See supra note 7 & accompanying text.
144. See supra note 7 & accompanying text.
145. The employer's interest is to be immune from liability for ordinary commuting injuries; the employee's interest is for injury protection during non-routine transits or the use of a
car. Hinojosa v. WCAB, 8 Cal. 3d 150, 157, 501 P.2d 1176, 1181, 104 Cal. Rptr. 456, 461
(1972).
146. "Secondary worksite" as used in this Note means the place where the employee intended to do the work regardless of the employer's requirement. For example, the home is a
secondary worksite in Wilson, 16 Cal. 3d at 184, 545 P.2d at 226, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 314; see
supra notes 119-26 & accompanying text.
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request evidenced by the insufficiency of the employer's premises. An
employer who requires work beyond the premises creates a secondary
worksite in a place or a car.147 This latter presumption reflects the employer's interest in not being the insurer of all employee injuries incurred
beyond the employer's premises. 148
The Model combines and expands features of the special risk 149 and
extended premises 150 exceptions to reflect present developments in the
case law.
The special risk rationale is utilized to distinguish ordinary commutes to and from the employer's premises from non-routine commutes,
which are excepted from the Rule. It requires an employee to show ad151
ded risk of a peculiar or an abnormal degree to avoid the Rule.
Examination of recent cases indicates a latent judicial requirement
of added risk only in situations when the employee is traveling to and
from the employer's premises; special risk has not been required in cases
involving employee travel to a secondary workplace. 152 For example, in
Hinojosa the employer's requirement that the employee provide a car
constituted non-routine transit.1 53 The court focused on the advantage
gained by the employer in not having to provide transportation between
worksites and the disadvantage imposed upon the employee in not being
able to avoid the hazards of private motor vehicle travel. 154 The court
stated that
When a business enterprise requires an employee to drive to and from
147. The resulting injury from such a request is excepted from the Rule under the travel
between two premises exception. See supra note 50.
148. "Although the basic idea of workmen's compensation conceives that the employee
should be protected against work-incurred injury, the concept does not extend to such a point
that it would cover every injury ....
Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d 157, 501 P.2d at 1181, 104 Cal.
Rptr. at 461.
149. See supra notes 44, 75-76, 92-97 & accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 44-45, 137-38 & accompanying text.
151. See supra note 53 & accompanying text. The Model utilizes this test because both
special risks and ordinary commuting situations solely concern work at the employer's premises. Thus, the Model excepts ordinary commutes on the same rationale that the special risk
exception extends the premises.
152. Added risk is not required by the courts when there is a secondary worksite or special
mission involved. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. WCAB, 104 Cal. App. 3d 528, 537 n.5, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 750, 756 n.5 (1980).
153. Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at 162, 501 P.2d at 1185, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 465 (unanimous
opinion).
154. Id. at 157, 501 P.2d at 1181, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 461. The court distinguished the
"special" request from the routine one: "the employer may designate a special authorized
route to the job that entails benefit to the employer but hazard to the employee; the worker
Id. at
must submit to dangers that he otherwise would have the choice of avoiding .....
159, 501 P.2d at 1182-83, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 462-63.
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its office in order to have his vehicle available for company business
during the day, accidents on the way to and from the office are statistically certain to occur. . . . [T]he risk of such accidents are risks incident to the business enterprise.1 55
The court distinguished this situation from injuries sustained while commuting on a public bus, which the court held should not be grounds for
compensation. 156
Taken as a whole, these statements indicate a latent judicial requirement that travel to and from the employer's premises must show some
increment of added risk in order to be distingushed from ordinary commuting. In contrast, there is no latent judicial requirement of added risk
in cases involving employee travel to a secondary workplace.1 57 In accordance with this distinction, requirements for compensable injuries
under the Model depend upon the workplace to which the employee has
traveled.
Additionally, the Model also expands the premises exception to include injuries that occur within the boundaries of the premises, on the
extended premises, on the property between worksites, or on employer
provided or required vehicles. This reflects a broader concept of premises than present terminology recognizes, 158 but is consistent with the
159
approach taken by the courts.
A latent judicial standard exists in the "line of premises" cases that
involve implied employer requests to complete work away from the employer's premises. An employer requirement to work at a secondary
workplace will not be implied unless the employer's premises are insufficient to permit completion of employment duties. In Hinojosa, the court
found an implied employer requirement to use the home as a secondary
workplace because the "obligations of the job reach[ed] out beyond the
premises .

.

...160 Similarly, in Bramall the unsuitability of the em-

155. Id. at 158, 501 P.2d at 1182, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
156. Id. at 157, 501 P.2d at 1181, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 461.
157. See supra note 152 & accompanying text.
158. See 2 W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(2)(b)(iii) (premises includes property under
the employer's ownership and control as well as property used for ingress by the employer but
which is neither owned nor controlled).
159. The Model expands "premises" to include vehicles that are required by the employer.
This is supported by Hinojosa, which treated a required vehicle as a "mandatory part of the
employment environment," 8 Cal. 3d at 160, 501 P.2d at 1183, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 463 (citing 1
A. LARSON, supra note 9, § 17.50), and as an "essential tool of the [employer's] trade," 8 Cal.
3d at 162, 501 P.2d at 1184, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
160. 8 Cal. 3d at 160, 501 P.2d at 1183, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 463 (citing I A. LARSON, supra
note 9, § 17.50). The court treated the employee's vehicle as a "mandatory part of the employment environment." Id. Thus, the employer's failure to provide a vehicle for the employee
constituted an implied employer requirement of a secondary workplace. Id.
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ployer's premises for the required translation work was an important factor in the court's finding of an implied requirement to work at a
secondary workplace. 161 The police cases also pointed toward the lack of
162
changing facilities as the basis for an exception.
It should be noted that travel involving a secondary worksite may
also be to and from the employer's premises when the employer requires
an employee to do work at home. Again, the employee does not have to
show added risk for an otherwise ordinary commute because the travel is
between two worksites. The employer can also create a secondary worksite when the use of a car is expressly or impliedly required. An employer makes an implied request whenever a car is necessary; the
employer's premises are insufficient to provide transportation; or public
163
transportation is unable to fulfill the employer requirement.
Thus, under the general extended premises exception, the Model's
focus on the nature of the workplace permits identification of the latent
judicial requirement of insufficiency of premises for an exception to the
Rule. Under the Model, an employee's injury is compensable if the employee had to complete required work at a secondary workplace due to
the inadequacies of the employer's premises. Moreover, the Model
makes unnecessary the present distinction between ongoing and infrequent employer requirements covered by the "special mission"

exception. 164
The Model also maintains the extant exception for injuries incurred
during compensated travel time. Compensation may be by payment of
wages or the payment of substantial travel expenses. 165 This exception is
161. 78 Cal. App. 3d at 160, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (uncontradicted evidence showed that
unlike Wilson, see supra notes 119-26 & accompanying text, the required work could not be
done on the employer's premises).
162. See supra notes 81-91 & accompanying text.
163. The Model departs from present case law in recognizing an implied requirement for a
car when public transportation is unavailable. See Baroid, 121 Cal. App. 3d at 574, 175 Cal.
Rptr. at 641 (court rejects claim that unavailability of public transportation alone establishes
an exception to the Rule). Such a provision, however, is consistent with the Hinojosa concept
of employer advantage. Hinojosa, 8 Cal. 3d at 157, 501 P.2d at 1181, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 461.
Whether an employer makes an implied request for a car, in part, depends upon the existence
of alternative transportation. When an employer requests an early or late start, at a time when
no other transportation exists, a fair reading of Hinojosa leads to the conclusion that the employee is impliedly required to furnish his own transportation. Id. at 16, 501 P.2d at 1183, 104
Cal. Rptr. at 463. This conclusion is also supported by the exception in Smith for employee
conduct that is "reasonably directed toward the fulfillment of his employer's requirements,
performed for the benefit and advantage of the employer." 69 Cal. 2d at 820, 447 P.2d at 369,
73 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
164. See supra notes 72-76 & accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 64-70 & accompanying text.
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independent of the secondary workplace exception.
The Model establishes a new conceptual framework for categorizing
exceptions by applying the two presumptions. The present extended
premises exception 166 falls within the Model's employer's premises presumption. The current exception for employer required travel 167 falls
within either presumption because it can involve the employer's premises
or a secondary worksite. The exception for injuries incurred during compensated travel 168 is independent of the secondary workplace exception
and, therefore, is a general exception to the Rule whenever it is
established.
Thus, the Model establishes exceptions to the going and coming
Rule in the following situations: First, when an employee is injured during the commute to or from the employer's premises and an added risk of
injury is present; second, when an employee is injured while traveling to
a secondary workplace pursuant to either the employer's express request
to work there or the employer's implied request to work there as evidenced by the insufficiency of the employer's premises; and third, when
an employee is injured during travel for which he is compensated by the
employer.
The Model improves the present approach in three ways. First, it
discards the special standard and special mission exceptions presently
used by courts. The subjectiveness of the special standard is too difficult
for practical application. 169 Second, the different analysis courts utilize
for ongoing and infrequent employer requests is discarded 170 because the
Model achieves the same results by distinguishing between ordinary
travel to the employer's premises and travel to a secondary worksite.
Third, the Model uses more objective standards to provide for orderly
analysis. Under the Model, the analysis is further improved by clearly
identifiable rationales that support its underlying presumptions.
The next section of this Note demonstrates the effect of the Model
by applying it to cases previously discussed.
Employer Premises Presumption
Cases decided under the present extended premises and employer
required travel exceptions now would fall within the employer premises
exception. The principle under the Model is that travel to and from the
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See
See
See
See
See

supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes

50-63 & accompanying text.
71-134 & accompanying text.
64-70 & accompanying text.
71-76 & accompanying text.
77-134 & accompanying text.
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employer's premises is ordinary and, therefore, excluded from coverage
unless added risk exists.
In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. WCAB,1 71 an employee was criminally attacked between his car and the front door of his home after working a
doubletime shift. The court found that the otherwise ordinary commute
was a special mission because the employer required a doubletime

shift. 172
Under the Model, the only intended workplace in Safeway Stores
was the employer's premises. To avoid the Rule in such a case, the employee must show the employer's requirement for a doubletime shift resulted in added risk of injury during the commute. Evidence introduced
at trial, however, indicated that the general crime rate in the neighborhood was lowest at the time the employee returned home.1 73 Although
the court did not address this possibility, there may have been a different
rate for personal attacks in comparison to the general crime rate. 174 If in
fact the personal attack rate was higher, this would constitute a peculiar
or abnormal degree of risk and require an exception to the Rule. The
court also did not consider whether fatigue due to the longer hours existed and, thus, constituted an added risk of injury. Absent evidence of
added risk, the employee in Safeway Stores would not overcome the presumption. The results from application of the Model are consistent with
the general rule denying an exception when the only special attribute of a
commute is an early start or late finish.1 7 5 The Safeway Stores court,
however, found that the case fell within the special mission exception
because of the extraordinary request that the employee work a double176
time shift.
Similarly, the court in Schreifer v. Industrial Accident Commission 177 held that the special mission exception applied to a deputy sheriff
who routinely worked irregular hours. The day the employee was injured the employer had requested the employee to report for duty "as
soon as possible." The court found that the request was special because
the employee had to report some six hours ahead of his scheduled
171. 104 Cal. App. 3d 528, 531, 163 Cal. Rptr. 750, 751-52 (1980).
172. Id. at 537, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 755-56; see supra notes 108-10 & accompanying text.
The special mission exception leaves unclear the point at which the court will consider the
nature of the request as creating an exception.
173. Safeway Stores, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 537 n.5, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 756 n.5.
174. Id.
175. See supra note 73.
176. Safeway Stores, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 537, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 755-56.
177. 61 Cal. 2d 289, 294-95, 391 P.2d 832, 835, 38 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355 (1964).
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178

Under the Model, the employee would have to show that the employer's request created added risk of injury. Although the court did not
address this issue, added risk somehow would have to result from the
employer required expediency. Without the Model's added risk requirement, the Schriefer court fails to provide a clear standard for determining
when reporting to work early justifies an exception. 179 The Arboleda decision also illustrates this confusion, as in that case the employer's requirement for overtime work amounted to a request for a double
commute, but no special mission was found. 180
The Model improves upon present analysis by discarding the subjective special standard in favor of the objective standard of added risk of
injury. This requirement makes the Model less sensitive to appealing
facts and thereby less susceptible to inconsistent results.
Secondary Worksite Presumption
Employer required travel to places other than the employer's premises falls within the secondary worksite presumption. Travel that involves work on secondary worksites is excluded from compensation
coverage by the Rule unless there is an express employer requirement to
work there, or an implied requirement due to insufficiency of the employer's premises. The Model's secondary workplace presumption is examined in the context of the police181 and homework 182 cases.
Police Cases
Courts have recognized an exception to the Rule in cases involving
uniformed police officers injured while commuting. This exception,
based on the police officer's duty to respond, assumes that service is rendered to the employer during the commute. In none of the cases, how18 3
ever, was the police officer engaged in responding to any police matter.
Although one court characterized the employee's function as "a uni178. Id. at 290, 391 P.2d at 832, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 352-53; see supra notes 106-07 & accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 106-07 & accompanying text. Alternatively, the court may have considered whether the employer impliedly required the use of a car. See supra note 163 & accompanying text.
180. 253 Cal. App. 2d at 486, 61 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09; see supra notes 111-12 & accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 81-88 & accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 119-32 & accompanying text.
183. At most the Garzoli court noted that the police chief testified that an officer would be
censured for not responding while in uniform. 2 Cal. 3d at 504, 467 P.2d at 834, 86 Cal. Rptr.
at 2.
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formed officer in an unmarked patrol car," this conclusion is unsupported by the evidence. 184 The present approach seems to create an
exception for employees who have a duty to respond, rather than for
employees involved in actual service to an employer. Yet when this reasoning is applied to the situation in Baroid, 85 in which the court did not
create an exception even though the employee had a duty to respond, the
results are inconsistent. This suggests that a sounder basis for these decisions is necessary.
The Model reconciles this inconsistency by focusing on the sufficiency of the employer's premises to complete the required work, and,
thereby, whether a secondary worksite is created. In each of the police
cases, the officer was excluded from or not provided changing facilities.' 86 According to the Model, the employer impliedly requested the
officer to use the home as a changing facility because the employer's
premises were inadequate. Travel between the secondary worksite and
the employer's premises is excepted from the Rule.
Applying the Model's principles to the Baroid decision eliminates
any inconsistency in the police cases. In Baroid'87 the employee carried
an "air page beeper" while on twenty-four hour call. Despite the similarity to a uniformed police officer's duty to respond, the court did not consider this analogy.' 88 Application of the Model to the facts in Baroid
results in the same conclusion as that reached by the court. Evidence
was not introduced indicating that the employer had created a secondary
worksite or that the premises were insufficient for the completion of the
employee's duties. Because the employee was traveling to perform work
only at the employer's premises, the Model requires that added risk must
be shown. Such factors might have been present because the commuting
89
hour was very early in the morning.
The Model eliminates the artificial duty to respond exception created in the police cases by focusing on whether the employer's premises
are inadequate to permit completion of the required work. The concept
of premises insufficiency is also useful in determining whether an em184.
185.

Carrillo, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 1180-81, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
121 Cal. App. 3d at 563, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 635; see supra notes 89-91 & accompanying

text.
186.

See supra note 86.

187.

121 Cal. App. 3d at 563, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 635.

188.

See supra note 90.

189. Absent such a finding, an exception could be based, as the court found, on the employer's agreement to pay travel expenses if an express request to report early existed. Alternatively, under the Model, the employee may have been able to show that the employer's request
implied the use of a car if regular public transportation was unavailable and the employer did
not provide a car. See supra note 163 & accompanying text.
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ployer has made an implied request to use the home as a secondary
worksite.
The Homework Cases
Courts presently use one of two lines of analysis for cases involving
employees who complete work at home. One analysis considers whether
the employer's requirement makes the home a secondary worksite under
the extended premises exception. 190 Under the second analysis, courts
consider whether the need to carry work materials requires the use of a
car, and therefore falls under the special mission exception. 191 In both
Wilson192 and Bramall,193 the employee took work home believing that
the employer impliedly required the work to be completed at home. Applying the above analysis, the court in Wilson found that despite the employer's encouragement to create special projects at home, the employer
did not require employees to work at home.1 94 The court also found that
the "cartage" of school materials did not require use of a car.1 9 5 In contrast, the employee in Bramall established a secondary workplace because the employer allowed the employee to do work at home. 96 Thus,
the courts seem to distinquish employer acquiescence from encouragement in deciding whether an implied requirement was made.
The Model eliminates the inconsistent treatment of implied employer requirements by considering whether the employer's premises are
190. See supra notes 119-21 & accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 119-21 & accompanying text.
192. 16 Cal. 3d at 184, 545 P.2d at 226, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 314; see supra notes 119-26 &
accompanying text.
193. 78 Cal. App. 3d at 154, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 106-07; see supra notes 127-32 & accompanying text.
194. 16 Cal. 3d at 185, 545 P.2d at 227, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 315. For an interesting comparison see Santa Rosa Junior College v. WCAB, 155 Cal. App. 3d 427, 202 Cal. Rptr. 80, hearing
granted,SF 24758 (1984). This case poses a situation similar to Wilson, but with stronger facts
favoring the employee. Smyth, a mathematics instructor and department chairperson, was
killed enroute home one evening while carrying student papers he intended to grade there. Id.
at 429, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 81. Testimony confirmed that student interruptions interfered with
the teacher's work at school. Id. at 430, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82. Some instructors avoided the
interruptions by working in the library or by limiting their office hours for student consultation. Id. The court found Smyth's work at home laudable but primarily for his own convenience. Id. at 433 nn.2-4, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 84 nn.2-4. This case presents stronger facts than
Wilson upon which to find an exception because there was a history of overtime work, including overnight stays, regular homework, greater employee responsibilities and a disruptive work
environment. Applying the Model, it appears that the employer's premises were adequate. Id.
at 432-33, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 83-84. Therefore, the employer did not make an implied requirement to work at home but rather Smyth's work habits made it more convenient for him to do
SO.
195. Wilson, 16 Cal. 3d at 185, 545 P.2d at 227, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
196. Bramall, 78 Cal. App. 3d at 158-59 n.2, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10 n.2.
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insufficient for completion of the required work. In Wilson, evidence indicated that other teachers accomplished their preparatory chores in the
school facilites.197 Because these facilities were available, the court concluded that teachers using their home as a secondary worksite did so at
their own convenience. 198 In comparison, the Bramall court found that
the after-hours environment precluded the employee from performing
translation work. 99
The secondary premises presumption under the Model reaches the
same result as these courts by determining whether there was evidence of
premises insufficient to support an implied request to work at home.
This simplification avoids the multitude of factors that the Bramall court
considered in order to find that the employer made an implied request. 2°°
Moreover, the premises insufficiency standard is an objective standard
for secondary workplace cases.
In summary, the Model offers a rationale that provides for consistent analysis in cases involving the going and coming rule. Furthermore,
the Model is simply stated so that employees can understand it, and
thereby avoid situations involving uncertainty of compensation coverage
rules. The Model could be appended to the general workers' compensation notice, which is required to be posted in every workplace. 20 1 Such
notification would encourage employees to seek clearer instructions from
their employers when they leave the premises on work matters. This
forewarning also would help promote the Act's aim of facilitating bene20 2
fits for injured workers.
Any model in an area as broad as that covered by the Rule, however, must be examined for its future impact. In this respect, two obvious consequences result from the Model. The first concerns the
temporary nature of secondary premises; the second suggests a new ex197. Wilson, 16 Cal. 3d at 185, 545 P.2d at 227, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 315.
198. Id.
199. Bramall, 78 Cal. App. 3d at 159-60, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
200. Id. at 158-59, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
201. A warning could be appended to the general notice of coverage required by the California Labor Code:
In order to be covered by workers' compensation while you travel in your car or
while you work at home, you must show that your employer (1) required you to do
so in writing or orally or (2) paid you during that time. Otherwise, you must show
that you were required to perform work that could not be done at your employer's
place of busniess. Travel injuries away from your employer's place of business are
not always covered. PROTECT YOURSELF; get clear orders from your supervisor
when you use your car or you home for work purposes.
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 3550 (West Supp. 1985).
202. See supra note 7.
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ception for lunchtime injuries when the employer does not provide any
facility. Althoxigh this Note cannot foresee all the ramifications of the
Model, analysis of these consequences demonstrates the benefit of the
Model's orderly analysis in resolving these and future problems in applying the Rule.
Consequences of the Model
Secondary Premises Are Temporary
Under the Model, an employer's express or implied requirement
that the employee work away from the employer premises creates a secondary worksite. This, however, does not necessarily mean travel both
to and from the secondary premises should be excepted. For example, if
the injury in Bramall2 0 3 had occurred the next morning during the trip to
the employer's premises rather than during the trip home the previous
evening, such travel would appear to be an ordinary commute and, therefore, not compensable. Under the Model, however, an exception is recognized when the trip furthers the employer's original requirement that
created the secondary premises. 2 4 Thus, the next morning's commute
has a business purpose because the work must be delivered to the employer. This justifies an exception to the Rule for the reciprocal journey
20 5
from a secondary worksite.
On the other hand, if the employer requires the finished work to be
mailed that evening, the work purpose for the secondary premises would
cease after mailing. Without a continuing business purpose based on an
express or implied employer request, there is no logical reason to find the
next morning's commute to be travel between two jobsites. The secondary workplace, therefore, must be viewed as temporary, and should support an exception for travel only as long as the business purpose
continues to make travel necessary.
203.

See supra notes 127-32 & accompanying text.

204. Because the Model rejects any distinction based on frequency of activity, the Smith
reasoning applies. See supra notes 71, 79 &accompanying text. The present judicial approach
would also support an exception for infrequent requirements because the travel was an essential part of the special services. See supra note 109 & accompanying text.
205. "[Wlhere the employee is combining his own business with that of his employer...
no nice inquiry will be made as to which business he was actually engaged in at the time of
injury, unless it clearly appears that neither directly [n]or indirectly could he have been servicing his employer." Bramall, 78 Cal. App. 3d at 157, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 108 (citing Lockheed
Aircraft Corp. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 756, 758-59, 172 P.2d 1, 3 (1946)).
See generally 2 W. HANNA, supra note 4, § 9.04(4)(g).
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Lunchtime Travel Injuries Exception
The second consequence of the Model is that an exception for injuries during unpaid lunchtime travel is necessary when the employer does
not provide adequate lunchroom facilities. Because the Act imposes an
implied-in-law employer requirement for employee personal comfort activities, 20 6 such a requirement should be treated as falling within the secondary worksite presumption. This would not automatically transform
an implied-in-law requirement into an exception because the employee
still must show that the employer's premises are inadequate. Such an
approach is more rational than the present fiction that an employee sus7
pends the employment relationship at lunch.20
In Mission Insurance Co. v. WCAB, 20 8 an exception was denied for
an employee who, when returning to work from lunch, suffered injuries
in an auto accident. The employee unsuccessfully argued that the rationale in Hornyak v. GreatAtlantic & Pacific Tea Co. 20 9 demonstrated that
lunchtime travel was distinguishable from going and coming travel. In
Hornyak, the court considered the lunch break simply to be an interruption of the active workday that required the employee's return. 2 10 The
court further reasoned that the timing and duration of lunch were beyond the employee's control and that the lunch break was work-related.2 11 For these reasons, the Hornyak court concluded that injuries
sustained during the lunch break were not excepted from the going and
2 12
coming rule.
Apart from Hornyak, the most important distinction between travel
under the Rule and personal comfort travel is that the employer controls
the availability of lunchtime facilities on the employer's premises. Because the personal comfort doctrine covers on-premises lunchtime injuries, the employer, in effect, determines whether workers' compensation
coverage will be available. It is this distinctive feature that suggests a
new exception under the Model.
The secondary worksite presumption could cover lunchtime injuries
206. See supra notes 98-104 & accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 98-100 & accompanying text.
208. 84 Cal. App. 3d 50, 57, 148 Cal. Rptr. 292, 296 (1978); see supra notes 101-04 &
accompanying text.
209. 63 N.J. 99, 305 A.2d 65 (1973). Subsequent to this decision, a New Jersy appeals
court interpretted a 1979 amendment to the state's workers' compensation law, see N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 34:15-36 (West Supp. 1985), as mandating that lunchtime travel is within the state's
going and coming rule. Ward v. Davidowitz, 191 N.J. Super. 518, 468 A.2d 250 (1983).
210. Id. at 106-08, 305 A.2d at 69-70.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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when lunch facilities do not exist. Again, the inadequacy of the employer's premises supports an express or implied employer requirement. 2 13 Although employee personal comfort is not an employer
requirement per se, the doctrine should be interpreted to create an
equivalent implied-in-law employer requirement for employee efficiency. 2 14 Present interpretation of the personal comfort doctrine provides a basis for such a conclusion because it extends coverage only to
on-premises injuries. Therefore, employees who travel for personal comfort purposes when premises insufficiency exists should be excepted from
the Rule and provided benefits.
In Hornyak, however, it appears that the court interpreted the doctrine to require an employer to provide not only a lunch facility, but hot
food as well. 215 This interpretation raises the unnecessary question of
whether the lack of vending machines or particular foods would constitute an employer premises insufficiency. The Hornyak approach loses
sight of the fact that the implied employer requirement of employee efficiency can be satisfied by simply providing a place to eat. At a minimum, the employer should provide a place to eat apart from the
employee's work station. Under this standard, the Model reaches the
same result as Mission Insurance Co., but provides a sounder basis for
deciding future cases.
The result under the Model would also improve the cost allocation
of injuries among employers. Presently, employers who provide lunch
facilities are penalized because they incur added liability for lunchtime
injuries occuring on the premises. In contrast, employers who do not
provide lunch facilities avoid this liability by forcing the employee to eat
elsewhere. Under the Model, this disparity is reversed because the employer who fails to provide lunch facilities will incur liability from travel
injuries.
Thus, the Model provides an analysis that would allow courts to
analyze better new situations under the Rule. In the case of lunchtime
travel, the issue is no longer whether it is special as compared to the
ordinary commute, but rather whether an implied-in-law requirement together with a premises insufficiency exists. The objective approach is
more likely to ensure consistency and predictability, qualities which the
present approach lacks.
213.

See supra notes 160-62 & accompanying text.

214. See supra notes 98-104.
215.

Hornyak, 63 N.J. at 106-07, 305 A.2d at 69-70.
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Conclusion
The going and coming rule plays an important role in determining
an employer's liability for injuries incurred during employee's travel.
The subjectivity of the "special circumstances" standard presently used
by the courts leads to inconsistent application of the Rule. The present
lack of a rationale behind the Rule and its exceptions results in unnecessary complexity and confusion.
Examination of judicially-created exceptions reveals that a comprehensive explanation may be demonstrated through a Model that incorporates the features of the extended premises and increased risk of injury
exceptions. Two mutually exclusive presumptions can be derived from
the case law based on these rationales. The presumptions operate to distinguish travel situations based on the intended worksite as an alternative
to the special circumstances standard. Exceptions for ordinary commutes that involve work at the employer's premises must show added
risk of injury. In contrast, exceptions for travel involving a secondary
worksite must show an express employer requirement to work there, or
an implied requirement evidenced by the insufficiency of an employer's
premises. Under the Model, present distinctions involving special circumstances are abandoned.
Applying the Model to the factual situations in existing case law
results in a more objective determination of whether a commute is ordinary, and whether an implied employer request has been made. Additionally, the Model will provide a more predictable and orderly analysis
of future cases.
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